We consider the question of how should a firm optimally set a sequence of prices in order to maximize its long-term average revenue given a continuous flow of strategic customers. In particular, customers arrive over time, are strategic in timing their purchases and are heterogeneous along two dimensions: their valuation for the firm's product and their willingness to wait before purchasing or leaving. The customers' patience and valuation may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. For this general formulation, we prove that the firm may restrict attention to "short" cyclic pricing policies, which have length twice the maximum willingness to wait of the customer population. We further establish results on the suboptimality of monotone pricing policies in general, and illustrate the structure of optimal policies. These are, in a typical scenario, characterized by nested sales, where the firm offers partial discounts throughout each cycle, offers a significant discount halfway through the cycle, with the largest discount offered at the end of the cycle. From a computational perspective, we exploit the structure of the underlying problem to develop a novel dynamic programming formulation for the problem that computes an optimal pricing policy in polynomial time (in the maximum willingness-to-wait). We further establish a form of equivalence between the problem of pricing for a stream of heterogeneous strategic customers and pricing for a pool of heterogeneous customers who may stockpile units of the product.
Introduction
Dynamic pricing is widely used in practice by firms in a variety of industries, ranging from airlines and hotels, to supermarkets and clothing outlets (Talluri & van Ryzin (2005) ). The drivers for dynamic pricing are multiple and range from the need to adjust prices to reflect the opportunity cost associated with scarce capacity to the stochastic nature of the demand environment and to the lack of information about the underlying demand. In such cases, prices are stochastic and difficult to predict for consumers. However, in various practical settings, dynamic pricing policies are highly predictable. For example, retail outlets and supermarkets frequently offer discounts in a predetermined fashion. In the United States, prices for many product categories, ranging from clothing articles to electronics, are often decreased during holiday weekends. Prices are even more deeply discounted for the holiday season that precedes Christmas (Warner & Barsky (1995) ). Why do retail stores use such predictable discounting strategies? It does not appear to be designed to liquidate inventory since stores typically increase order sizes to suppliers in anticipation of the holiday shopping frenzy. A more likely explanation is that firms are engaging in a form of intertemporal price discrimination in order to capture surplus from a heterogeneous customer base.
For example, customers who are high-value and have low patience buy when the need for a given product arises, while ones who have a lower valuation but are more patient may monitor the market and wait until they see a promotional price. A pricing policy meant to extract the maximum revenues will potentially adjust prices over time to capture low value customers while still taking advantage of the revenue opportunities associated with impatient customers.
In the present paper, we study the firm's problem of how to set prices over time in order to maximize revenues given a customer population with heterogeneous patience levels and valuations.
There are three main contributions. First, we establish that such a problem is amenable to analysis under fairly general assumptions and that crisp insights on the optimal policy may be derived.
Second, we develop a dynamic programming approach with a novel state-space structure that leverages the structure of the problem and yields an efficient procedure to compute optimal policies.
Third, we establish a clear connection between two settings that lead customers to time their purchases: varying patience levels for one-time purchases and varying storage capacities for repeat purchases (in which case consumers may stockpile). In particular, we show that the two problems are, in some sense, equivalent.
Main results. We study a firm selling a single product to a flow of heterogeneous customers that arrive over time. Each customer arrives with unit demand and is characterized by her valuation for the product and her willingness to wait before purchasing. The latter may be interpreted as the time the customer is willing to spend monitoring the market. The customers' valuations and willingness to wait can take a very general form and in particular may be correlated. The firm's problem is to select prices to offer for all future periods, in order to maximize long-term average revenues. The customers are assumed to be strategic; they anticipate the firm's prices and optimize their purchase timing over the time they monitor the system (based on their willingness to wait).
If the lowest price the customer sees during her time in the system is below her valuation, then she purchases the product at that lowest price, otherwise she leaves the system without purchasing any product. Roughly speaking, this problem may be interpreted as a two stage game in which the firm first selects an infinite sequence of prices and based on the latter, customers select their optimal purchasing strategy.
We first establish that, for any joint distribution between patience levels and valuations, the firm may restrict attention to cyclic pricing policies. This initial result validates some of the cyclic policies being adopted in practice and enables one to narrow down the space of policies that need to be considered for optimization purposes. Using the structure of the firm's price optimization problem, we further show that one may restrict attention to "short" cycles, which have length at most twice the maximum willingness to wait of the customer population. This is a tight bound on the shortest cycle length of an optimal policy. This crisp result relies on a series of structural insights, which revolve around the concept of effective price tables, an object that summarizes the mapping from the prices actually paid to consumer segments and arrival times. In particular, the result relies on a reflection principle which establishes that a policy and its time reflection are revenue equivalent.
Given the attention that monotone cyclic polices have received in the literature (more on that in the review below), we study the structure of optimal policies and the subclass of monotone cyclic policies. For this subclass of policies, we show that one may further restrict the length of cycles without loss of revenue. However, the class of monotone cyclic policies is, in general, suboptimal.
We derive a class of problems in which they will always be suboptimal and show numerically that, in some instances, if the firm restricts itself to cyclic monotone policies, it would earn less than 88% of what it would earn from an unrestricted optimal policy. Optimal policies, in general, have a rich structure. In particular, we show that if the pricing policy cycle is relatively long (the period is close to twice the maximum willingness to wait), then the lowest price should be offered at the end of a cycle and the second lowest price should be offered halfway to the end of the cycle. We also show numerically that the optimal policy often takes the form of nested sales, where the firm offers small sales often, medium-sized sales less often and its largest sale only once per selling season.
While one may restrict attention to cyclic policies with bounded length, the number of potential price cycles is exponentially large, bringing to the foreground the question of how to compute optimal pricing policies. We develop a novel dynamic programming approach for the problem.
Leveraging the above results on the cycle length bound, and the underlying structure of the problem through the geometry of the effective price tables, we develop an algorithm to compute an optimal policy that is polynomial in the maximum willingness to wait and linear in the number of prices the firm can use. This approach is based on a dynamic program that uses a novel state and action space, which enables one to solve for an optimal policy recursively.
The last main result we develop lies in establishing a fundamental connection between the problem of pricing for consumers with one-time purchases who time their purchase over a window and that of pricing for repeat consumers who may stockpile the product, a common problem encountered, for example, by grocery stores. We first analyze the stockpiling problem faced by consumers given a sequence of prices. We establish, through a proper accounting scheme from prices to units consumed, that in an optimal stockpiling policy, the effective price for a potential unit to be consumed in a given period is the minimum of the past prices over a window of length driven by the storage capacity. Based on this result, the firm's problem can be shown to be, roughly speaking, the mirror image of the problem with one-time purchases (with proper parameters). We then establish that the two problems admit the same value and that an optimal policy for one problem is also optimal for the other one. In other words, the two problems are essentially equivalent.
Related literature. How to optimally set prices over time given that consumers strategically time their purchases is a classical question in economics (see, e.g., Coase (1972) , Stokey (1979) , Conlisk et al. (1984) , Besanko & Winston (1990 ), Sobel (1991 ) and one that has received significant attention in the revenue management and dynamic pricing community; see the recent reviews by Shen & Su (2007) and Aviv et al. (2011) .
When consumers are strategic, various considerations come into play in their purchase decisions, including the future prices, the evolution of valuations and availability of the product. study dynamic pricing with capacity constraints in the presence of strategic customers. They also illustrate the extent of revenue deterioration one may experience if one ignores the presence of strategic customers. Su (2007) finds that in a setting with limited inventory, both markdown and markup policies can be optimal depending on the problem instance. The paper by Ahn et al. (2007) studies joint pricing and manufacturing decisions when demand in a given period is a function of the price in multiple periods. Our model also possesses the latter feature and our analysis, like theirs, also exploits the regeneration of the system (or system reset) and the policy decomposition that follows. Our work and theirs, however, deal with fairly different problems (we do not study manufacturing decisions) and, overall, the techniques we develop are quite different from theirs. Borgs et al. (2011) , motivated by the question of how to sell online services, consider how to set prices to extract revenue while guaranteeing service availability to all customers willing to pay the price set by the firm. Their model also assumes consumers arrive over time and have windows of interest, but their focus is on handling time-varying service capacity constraints. Deb (2010) and Garrett (2011) capture the impact of customers' valuations evolving stochastically. In particular, Garrett (2011) shows that stochastic valuations can drive the optimal price path to be non-monotone.
Our work takes a more fundamental starting point, attempting to isolate and capture the impact of a heterogeneous population on the optimal dynamic pricing policy, absent any other considerations. In this sense, our work builds up on the classical papers on intertemporal price discrimination. Stokey (1979 Stokey ( , 1981 shows that a firm facing a heterogeneous population of customers can maximize revenue by either using a sequence of decreasing prices or by offering a single constant price, depending on the distribution of customers' valuations and the firm's ability to commit to a price path. The paper that is most closely related to our work is Conlisk et al. (1984) , who show that if a new cohort of consumers arrives at every period, then the firm's optimal strategy is to use a cyclic pricing policy. In their model, a given consumer valuation could be either low or high; the firm sells only to high value consumers most periods, but sells to the low value ones as soon as enough of them accumulate in the system. The paper shows the interesting phenomenon that seasonal pricing arises naturally in stationary models as a result of the firm performing intertemporal price discrimination. The assumption that customers only have two possible valuations and are in the system forever drives the optimality of cyclic monotone policies. We show in the present paper that, as soon as one departs from such assumptions, there is no reason for monotone policies to be optimal in general, and the rich price dynamics observed in practice with smaller and larger sales being offered at different times may be rationalized.
In Section 6, we study the problem of how to do intertemporal pricing in the presence of a consumers who stockpile the firm's goods. Two of the early papers on this topic are Blattberg et al. (1981) and Jeuland & Narasimhan (1985) , which show how firms can price discriminate between consumers with high and low holding costs by using dynamic pricing. In recent work, Su (2010) shows that, in a rational expectations model, the firm should use recurring promotions when customers who shop frequently are willing to pay more than occasional shoppers.
On the empirical side, recent work by Li et al. (2011) estimate the extent to which consumers are strategic in timing their purchases in the context of airline pricing. Pesendorfer (2002) and Hendel & Nevo (2006 , 2009 study pricing of items in supermarkets, and estimate demand elasticity, accounting for demand accumulation, showing that such an effect is significant. The class of models we consider in Section 6 includes the demand model estimated in the latter paper in the absence of competition, and the class of models presented in Section 2 includes the perfect foresight model of Li et al. (2011) .
Broadly speaking, by taking as a starting point a general joint distribution between customer valuation and patience, the present paper sheds light on the structure of a fundamental problem, that of intertemporal price discrimination. Our paper shows that, even in the absence of inventory constraints, the decision-maker needs to go beyond monotone policies to maximize revenues, and the resulting policies often take the form of nested sales. Despite the complexity of the structure of optimal policies, we show that the optimal price paths involve fairly short cycles and the problem of finding such policies is in fact a tractable one.
Model
We consider a monopolist facing a multi-period single product pricing problem. Customers arrive with unit demand and are characterized by their valuation for the product v ∈ [0, V ] as well as their willingness to wait w ∈ {0, 1, ..., S}, for some V ∈ R + and S ∈ N. Customers are assumed infinitesimal and arrive at a steady stream so that, in each period, the mass of the incoming customer population with patience w is given by γ w . For each patience level w, the cumulative distribution of values is given by F w (·). We do not impose any assumptions on the demand model {γ w , F w (·)} w=0,...,S . In particular, the correlation between the customers' valuation for the product and willingness to wait is arbitrary. We consider a deterministic flow of customers, so that in every period t = 1, 2, ..., the mass of customers arriving with patience w and valuation below or equal to v is exactly γ w F w (v).
We let D denote the set of feasible prices available to the firm, which we assume to be an arbitrary nonempty closed subset of [0, V ]. The firm may select any pricing sequence p = {p t } t∈N with elements in D. We let P denote the set of all such sequences.
Customers are assumed to be strategic and can fully anticipate the firm's future prices, so that a customer arriving in period t with a willingness to wait of w will only consider purchasing the firm's product at the period that has the lowest price among {t, t + 1, ..., t + w}. For a given pricing policy p ∈ P, we say that a customer that arrives in period t with patience w faces an effective price of
and will purchase the product only if her valuation is above the effective price she encounters.
Given the consumer behavior outlined above and a pricing policy p ∈ P, the long-run average revenue collected by the firm is given by
where
, which represents the fraction of consumers with patience w that value the product at least v. 1 The firm's objective is to select a pricing policy to maximize its long-run average revenues, i.e., the firm solves
Discussion of the assumptions. Our model considers a long-run objective for the decision-maker and assumes customers have windows of interest rather than discount future rewards or pay waiting costs. In that sense, it differs from the formulations of a dynamic pricing problem in which one or both the firm and the customers use exponential discounting to tradeoff present versus future payoffs, or from a formulation such as the one in Su (2007) , where customers pay a waiting cost that is linear on the number of periods they wait before purchasing. The present paper focuses on a setting in which consumers have a time window over which they consider purchasing, with an arbitrary link between the length of the windows and the willingness-to-pay distribution is general.
It relates to models in which consumers have a homogeneous patience level (see, e.g., Ahn et al. (2007) and Yin et al. (2008) ). While the model we consider is of independent interest, it also allows us to establish a fundamental connection between the present problem and that of pricing to a pool of consumers who stockpile (Section 6). Replacing discounting with windows yields significant structure in the problem and one may still capture the heterogeneity among the customers and the resulting phenomena. For example, if customers used exponential discounting, customers with a higher valuation would be more likely to buy immediately rather than ones with a lower valuation.
Note that if this type of intertemporal behavior does occur in practice, one may accommodate it within our framework by assigning a smaller willingness-to-wait to a high value customer.
Having the firm maximize its long-term revenue also allows us to bypass the still unsettled debate on whether firms are able to commit to future prices. One of the first papers on intertemporal price discrimination, Stokey (1979) , as well as several recent papers by Board (2008) , Deb (2010 ), Borgs et al. (2011 and Garrett (2011) , study optimal dynamic pricing from the perspective of a monopolist who is able to commit to future prices. Other papers such as Coase (1972) , Conlisk et al. (1984) , Besanko & Winston (1990) and Sobel (1991) argue that a monopolist should not be able to commit to future prices and therefore should price today based on the fact that its future self will choose tomorrow's price. Consider a dynamic version of our model where the firm announces nothing but the current price at each period and the customers, being fully strategic, form rational beliefs about future prices. Because we assume a long-term average revenue objective for the monopolist, the firm's objective will look identical to the initial one at any finite history. That is, the firm's objective is always given by Eq. (2), which is independent on what has occurred on any finite set of previous periods. Therefore, even in the subgame perfect equilibrium of a game where the firm does not announce future prices, the firm would still use the price sequence that optimizes Eq. (2) and rational customers should be able to anticipate that. Hence, regardless of whether the firm has commitment power, the firm's pricing problem is the one given in Eq. (3).
Optimal Pricing Policies
In this section, we show that the pricing problem (3) admits an optimal solution. We show that one may restrict attention to cyclic policies, and that the maximum length of cycles to consider is fairly "short."
Policy decomposition and optimality of cyclic policies
A first important concept that we introduce is that of resetting periods. Whenever prices are at their lowest, the entire system resets in the sense that all customers depart the system, either by making a purchase or by deciding not to purchase at all. 2 There is no value for a strategic customer to stay in the system past the date when the lowest price is being offered. Resetting, however, also occurs when prices are not at their lowest price overall. If the price offered today is lower than all the prices to be used in the next S periods, the system also resets since no customer is willing to wait more than S periods to make a purchase. This occurs whenever the current price p t is equal to the effective price faced by a customer of maximum patience e t,S (p).
Definition 1. For any pricing policy p, let V (p) ⊆ N be the set of periods such that p t = e t,S (p).
We call the elements in V (p) the reset periods of the system.
As a convention, we include 0 in the set V (p) since the system is empty when the first customers arrive in period t = 1. We now introduce the subclass of cyclic pricing policies.
Definition 2. A pricing policy is cyclic if there exists some integer L > 0 such that p t+L = p t for all t ∈ N. The smallest L > 0 for which this holds is called the cycle length L p of policy p.
With a slight abuse of notation, we represent a cyclic policy p by the finite sequence of prices p = (p 1 , ..., p Lp ). Whenever we discuss a policy (p 1 , ..., p T ), we are referring to the policy for which this finite sequence of prices is repeated infinitely often.
Given the above, one may now introduce the notion of the components of an arbitrary pricing policy in P. Purchasing patterns between a given pair of reset periods can be analyzed independently from prices offered before and after such reset periods, since only the customers arriving in between those two reset periods are affected by these prices.
Definition 3. Let V i (p) be i th smallest element in the set V (p). For any i ∈ N, we say the finite sequence of prices
) is the i th component policy of p.
2 Without loss of efficiency, one may assume that customers behave in this fashion.
Lemma 1. Suppose the set of prices D is finite. Then, for any policy p, the number of time periods elapsed between any two reset periods is at most S|D|, i.e.,
In other words, when there is a finite number of prices, the component policies of an arbitrary policy p cannot be arbitrarily long. The result stems from the fact that whenever a period t is not a reset period, there must exist a period within {t + 1, ..., t + S} where the price offered is strictly less than p t . Repeating this process recursively will necessarily lead to a reset period in finite time as prices may not decrease below min{D}. The next result highlights the connection between the performance of a policy and its components and will be a key building block in showing that the problem admits an optimal solution as well as restricting the set of policies that one needs to consider.
Lemma 2. (Policy Decomposition) Suppose the set of prices D is finite. Then, the long-run average revenues generated by a pricing policy p are at most the supremum of the long-run average revenues generated by each of its component policies, i.e.,
The idea behind the Policy Decomposition Lemma is as follows: the average revenue from a pricing policy is nothing but a convex combination of all the average revenues obtained by the component policies. If the average revenue obtained in between a pair of reset periods is higher than in other periods, then one may replace these other prices by the ones from the component policy that yields higher average revenue. We can use this lemma, combined with Lemma 1, to obtain an important initial result on the nature of optimal pricing policies.
Proposition 1. Suppose the set of prices D is finite. Then, there exists a cyclic pricing policy with cycle length at most S|D| that achieves the supremum in (3).
The proposition above has two immediate implications. The first one is showing that the supremum of the price optimization problem given in Eq. (3) is attained. Therefore, the notion of an optimal pricing policy is well defined. The second implication is that there exists an optimal solution that is cyclic. The result relies on the fact that the the maximum time elapsed between two reset periods is S|D|, and hence the set of possible component policies is finite. This, in turn, implies that the supremum in Eq. (4) can be replaced by a maximum over finitely many cyclic component policies.
Proposition 1 enables one to restrict attention to cyclic policies without loss of optimality. 3
However, the bound on the length of optimal cycles in Proposition 1 depends on the number of prices at the firm's disposal and may be a weak bound if the firm has many prices at its disposal.
We next establish a tight bound that is independent of the number of prices.
Reflection principle and optimality of short cyclic policies
The reflection principle. We next analyze in further detail the structure of the pricing problem.
To do so, we introduce the notion of effective price tables for cyclic policies. One may represent the effective prices of a cyclic policy of length T through a matrix of size T × S, in which each entry corresponds to the the effective price faced by a customer with patience the row number and arriving in the period given by the column number.
Let us consider a numerical example with maximum willingness-to-wait S = 3, a cyclic policy with length T = 8 and decreasing prices p = (15, 12, 8, 7, 4, 3, 2, 1 who are completely impatient (w = 0) or already arrive at a period when the lowest price is being offered. In contrast, the only customers who wait in the case of the cyclic increasing policy, are the customers who can wait until the price falls to its lowest value (p = 1); everyone else either purchases at their arrival period or does not purchase at all. However, even though the pricing policies lead to very different consumer behavior, they yield identical revenue. This can be observed by counting the number of times each effective price appears for each value of w. For both pricing policies, the effective price of 15 only appears for w = 0 and it only appears once; the effective price of 12 only appears for w = 0 and w = 1 and only appear once for each of these values, and so on. Cyclic decreasing policies and cyclic increasing policies appear at first brush to be very different policies and do indeed lead to different purchasing patterns; however they are in fact revenue equivalent. This is a general result that is not restricted to monotone cyclic policies that we formalize below.
Lemma 3. (Reflection) A cyclic pricing policy p = (p 1 , ..., p T ) and its time reflection p r = (p T , ..., p 1 ) yield the same revenue, i.e., R(p) = R(p r ).
The proof of the result resides in extending and formalizing the informal counting argument above. In particular, the result uses the following relationship that holds for all t and w, e t,w (p) = min{e t,w−1 (p), e t+1,w−1 (p)}.
That is, the effective price faced by a customer that arrives at time t with willingness-to-wait w is the lowest between the effective prices of a customer that arrives at the same period but is only willing to wait w − 1 and someone who arrives one period later and is only willing to wait w − 1. Starting from the fact that {e t,0 (p)} t=1..T and {e t,0 (p r )} t=1..T are reflections of each other, one can use Eq. (5) recursively to show that for each value of w from 1 to S, {e t,w (p)} t=1..T and {e t,w (p r )} t=1..T contain exactly the same elements.
We are now in a position to state one of our main results.
Theorem 1. Suppose the set of prices D is finite or that F w (·) is Lipschitz continuous for all w = 0, ..., S. Then there exists an optimal cyclic pricing policy with cycle length at most 2S.
In other words, the only cycles that need to be considered are short, in the sense that they need not exceed twice the maximum willingness to wait. Furthermore the bound above is sharp, that is, there are instances in which all cycles with length strictly lower than 2S are suboptimal (see Figure 5 and the discussion that follows in Section 5). When the set of prices is finite, the main idea underlying the result is as follows. From the Policy Decomposition Lemma, we immediately obtain that the lowest price should only be used once per pricing cycle in the shortest optimal cyclic policy. Less obviously, the same lemma also implies that the second lowest price should only be used up to S periods before the lowest price is used. The key idea in the proof is to use the same logic on the reflected policy (which yields the same long-run revenues by Lemma 3). Doing so, one obtains that the second lowest price should only be used up to S periods after the lowest point. If the optimal policy had length longer than 2S, there would always be an option to further decompose the policy or its reflection without decreasing long-run average revenues.
Even though the Policy Decomposition Lemma applies only if the set of prices D is finite, the theorem applies to any closed set D ⊆ [0, V ], when we further assume some regularity with regard to the willingness to pay distributions. The proof for the case in which D contains infinitely many prices involves using a sequence of policies that only rely on finitely many prices, such that the long-run average revenues of these policies converge to the long-run average revenues of the optimal policy. The result then follows due to the Lipschitz continuity of the revenue function and the compactness of the set of prices.
The theorem above restricts significantly the set of policies to consider. As we will see next, this result also enables one to construct an efficient algorithm to find an optimal policy.
Computing Optimal Policies: A Geometric Approach
Theorem 1 established existence of an optimal cyclic pricing policy with length at most 2S. While this implies that cycles under consideration can be fairly short, the number of such cycles is still very large (it is exponential in S when the price set is finite). In this section, we show, by leveraging the structure of the problem at hand, that the problem of finding an optimal pricing policy is tractable and construct an algorithm that efficiently finds an optimal cycle.
A geometric view of the effective price table. Our approach to the problem is centered around the geometry of the effective price table. Recall that for a cyclic policy p with length T , the effective prices table is a T × S table with the effective prices e t,w (p) for times t = 1, ..., T and w = 0, ..., S. Since the policy is cyclic, we can assume without loss of generality that the smallest price is used in the last period, i.e., p T = min 1≤k≤T p k . We use the notation p (k) to represent the k th lowest price used in policy p and T (k) to represent the first period in which p (k) is used. Therefore, our convention that p T is the lowest price in the cycle is equivalent to p T = p (1) or T (1) = T . The first observation about the effective price table is that the set of elements where the effective price is p (1) forms a triangle, as can be seen in Figure 1 . That is, for customers with w = 0, only the ones that arrive in period t = T in the cycle are able to purchase at the lowest price. Among the ones with w = 1, customers who arrive in periods t = T − 1 or t = T are able to buy at the lowest price, and so on. This triangle would have its left side truncated if p is a cyclic policy with length T ≤ S. The set of effective prices corresponding to the second lowest price p (2) may also be described geometrically. It also takes the form of a triangle, but it is potentially truncated on both the left and right side, as illustrated by the striped object in Figure 2 . One may continue to represent the set of effective prices corresponding to the k th lowest price recursively. Table   A dynamic programming recursion. The central idea in building our algorithm is as follows: no customer will ever skip over a low price to buy at a higher one. Recall that T (2) is the first period when the price is equal to p (2) . Some customers that arrive between t = 1 and t = T (2) might be patient enough to wait until the lowest price p (1) . For these very patient customers, the prices offered in periods from t = 1 up to T (1) − 1 are irrelevant. For everyone else arriving between t = 1 and t = T (2) , all prices offered after t = T (2) are irrelevant. The prices being offered after T (2) are either equal to or higher than p (2) or too far into the future to be worth waiting for.
Conditionally on p (2) being the second lowest price and its position T (2) , all prices between t = 1 and t = T (2) − 1 may be computed independently from prices between t = T (2) + 1 and t = T (1) − 1.
The latter observation is the key step to formulate a dynamic programming recursion for the problem. The state space of this dynamic program is an unusual one and is best understood geometrically. If one ignores all the customers that are able to buy at the lowest price in the cycle (the triangle on the right in Figure 1 ), one is left with an effective price table as depicted in Figure   3 . We have argued that conditional on a period T (2) for the second lowest price and its price p (2) , all the prices before T (2) and after T (2) may be selected independently (subject to a lower bound on prices). This idea gives rise to the dynamic programming recursion. The key geometric insight that allows us to construct the state space can be gleaned from Figure 4 : once one removes the customers that purchase at the second lowest price p (2) , we are left with two problems that are identical in structure to the original one, but smaller in size. The state space therefore is composed of a pair (n, p) where n denotes the number of periods being considered and p represents the lowest price that can be used during those periods. We define a value function W n (p) to represent the maximum revenue that can be obtained over n periods assuming that the prices being offered over these periods is at least p and that, in period n + 1, a price lower than p will be offered. Formally, 
Using the observation that customers do not skip over low prices to buy at a higher one later, we obtain that the value function W n (p) satisfies the following Bellman equation
where W 0 (p) = 0, and t n,k,w counts the number of periods between 1 and n in which the customers with patience w will purchase at the lowest price in the interval if such price is offered in period k. For a given n and k, the collection of t n,k,w for all w is represented by the shaded area in the middle of Figure 4 . Mathematically,
where x + = max{x, 0}. Once one has computed the value of W n (p) for a given n and all p ∈ D, one may determine the optimal policy of length n + 1 by adding the lowest price in the cycle at position T = n + 1 (see Figure 1 ). The revenue obtained over the first T periods by the best policy of cycle length T is then
Computing an optimal policy. Since, by Theorem 1, there exits an optimal policy that is cyclic with length at most 2S, the optimal pricing policy can be determined by computing the average per-period revenue of an optimal policy for each T from 1 to 2S, i.e.,
leading to the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If the set of prices D is finite, then an optimal pricing policy can be computed in time
In other words, despite the fact that the number of cycles of length up to 2S is exponential in S, an optimal policy may be determined in polynomial time in S by exploiting the underlying structure the problem.
When the set of available prices D is not finite, one may still leverage the recursion above. If the willingness to pay distributions are Lipschitz, one may discretize the set D and use the regularity of the distributions to find a near-optimal policy efficiently. For any ε > 0, we say that a pricing The two theorems above establish that the problem of finding optimal (for finite price sets) or ε-optimal pricing policies is tractable. In the next section, we use these results to compute optimal prices in some numerical instances, and further explore the optimal pricing structure for intertemporal price discrimination.
Structure of Optimal Pricing Cycles
We next illustrate several structural properties of optimal pricing policies.
Tightness of the optimal cycle length bound. We first demonstrate that the upper bound 2S on the length of an optimal cycle presented in Theorem 1 is tight, i.e., there are instances in which indeed the firm will take full advantage of 2S periods to price discriminate its heterogeneous customer base. In Figure 5 , we report the output of the dynamic programming recursion for two instances. The panels (a) and (b) correspond to a case in which S = 3 and consumers have deterministic willingness to pay, with (γ w , v w ) = (1, 5 − w) for w = 0, 1, 2, 3. In other words, in such an instance, all customer segments have equal size, the customers within a patience segment are all identical in terms of valuation and more patient customers have lower valuations for the product. In addition, we assume the set of available prices is D = {1, ..., 5}. The panels (c) and (d) correspond to a case in which S = 4 and consumers have deterministic willingness to pay, with v w = 5 − w for w = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and γ 0 = 4, γ w = 1 for w = 1, 2, 3 and γ 4 = 3. In addition, the price set is {1, ..., 5}. Focusing first on the case S = 3 and in particular panel (b), we observe that it is strictly suboptimal to use any cyclic policy with length strictly below 2S = 6. This establishes that the bound from Theorem 1 is tight. As a matter of fact, panel (b) further illustrates that one may limit revenue collection by a significant amount by restricting attention to shorter cycles.
Nested sales. Both panels (a) and (c) in Figure 5 depict optimal policies. We observe that the pricing structure within cycles is in general non-monotone. In particular, optimal polices tend to alternate between sales and the full price (targeting the impatient high-value customers), and the sales are offered with multiple levels of discount depth. The lowest price is offered at the end of the cycle and the second lowest in a cycle is offered exactly in the middle of the cycle (in period 3 for panel (a) and period 4 for panel (c)). The latter observation is more general in the following sense.
Proposition 2 (Nested Sales). Suppose the shortest cyclic policy that solves Eq. (3) has a cycle of length T that satisfies S + 1 ≤ T ≤ 2S. Then, there exists an optimal policy with cycle length T in which the lowest price appears last in the cycle and the second lowest price belongs to {T − S, ..., S}.
In other words, partial discounts will be found in the middle of a cycle when an optimal cycle is long in the sense that it is close to 2S periods long. This phenomenon seems to repeat itself between two discounts, as observed in periods 2 and 6 in panel (c). Conlisk et al. (1984) first noted that seasonal (cyclic) pricing variations would emerge in a setting with stationary demand when the firm was performing some form of intertemporal price discrimination. However, in their model with two valuations, discounting, and consumers that may stay in the system forever, they find that such cycles take the form of cyclic monotone policies. In the present setting with heterogeneity over time windows, a continuumm of valuations and the absence of discounting for consumers, we find that optimal policies often take the form nested sales, where the firm offers small sales spread out through a selling season, a larger mid-season sale and its largest sale at the end of a selling season.
The subclass of monotone cyclic policies. We now study several aspects of monotone cyclic properties. In particular, we bound their cycle length, characterize conditions under which they are strictly suboptimal and analyze the revenue loss for a firm that restricts itself to such policies. The first result bounds the length of optimal policies within the set of all cyclic monotone policies.
Proposition 3. For any cyclic policy that is monotone over a cycle, there exists a cyclic monotone policy with cycle length at most S + 1 that yields at least as much revenue.
In other words, when focusing on cyclic monotone policies, it is sufficient to focus on policies of length at most S + 1. Longer monotone cycles would necessarily have multiple reset periods within each cycle, which is unnecessary by the Policy Decomposition Lemma. The policy in the bottom panel of Figure 6 , which is discussed below, shows that this result is tight.
Exploring the structure of a cycle in the most general case is difficult given the combinatorial nature of the problem. However, one may further refine the analysis of optimal policies in special cases of interest. Next, we focus on the class of problems in which consumers have a deterministic patience-dependent willingness to pay. Assumption 1 also imposes that consumers with lower patience have higher willingness to pay, which is natural in many settings. We define
as the single price revenue per period when the firm uses price p throughout.
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Suppose that R(v i ) is non-monotone in i ∈ {0, ..., S} and let j = min{i ∈ {1, ..., S} : R(v i−1 ) > R(v i )}. Then an optimal cyclic policy either contains at most j + 1 periods or is cyclic non-monotone.
Proposition 4 excludes the optimality of monotone policies that are longer than j + 1. For
, corresponding to a case in which the seller prefers to sell only to the impatient customers than use a price that sells to both impatient and those with patience w = 1, then an optimal policy either contains at most two prices or is non-monotone.
To further illustrate that monotone policies might in general leave significant revenues on the table, consider the following example with maximum patience level S = 7 and three segments of customers: impatient, moderately patient and very patient. In particular, suppose (γ 0 , v 0 ) = (0.1, 10), (γ 3 , v 3 ) = (0.5, 2), (γ 7 , v 7 ) = (2, 0.5), and γ w = 0 for w = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6. Note that this specification satisfies Assumption 1. Figure 6 depicts an optimal policy (top panel) as well as the best policy among monotone cyclic policies (bottom panel). The ratio of the performance of the latter compared to the optimal policy is of 87.53% in this instance. The example illustrates the need for nested sales for better price discrimination. In the example above, the natural choice of price to use for periods 1 through 3 is v 0 ; at period 4, the firm has to decide whether to target customers with intermediate patience, but if restricted to monotone policies, this switch in price implies that the firm will not be able to perfectly target impatient customers until the end of a cycle. For any candidate monotone policy, a similar trade-off will be present, i.e., the firm will have to decide whether to set a high price that will cause a significant portion of the customers not to purchase or to set a low one that will cause the firm to imperfectly target a significant segment of the customers until the end of the cycle. In contrast, a policy that is unconstrained does not face this trade-off. The optimal policy depicted on the top panel is able to target customers with moderate patience in the fourth period of a cycle while returning to target the impatient high-value customers in the next period. 
Intertemporal Pricing with Consumer Stockpiling
In the present section, we show that there is a close relationship between the problem analyzed in the previous sections (Problem (3)) and that of pricing for a pool of heterogeneous consumers who may stockpile units of the product. In particular, we demonstrate that the framework developed, the effective price table geometry and the results that followed may be applied to another fundamental problem, that of pricing to a heterogeneous population of consumers who may stockpile the product.
The latter problem has been studied in the economics and operations literatures and we refer the reader to Su (2010) and the references therein for further background.
Model of consumer stockpiling. We consider a monopolist facing a multi-period single product pricing problem. The customer population is assumed to be present throughout, with unit demand per period. These are characterized by their valuation for the product v ∈ [0, V ], which is constant from period to period, as well as their storage capacity c ∈ {0, 1, ..., C}, for some V ∈ R + and C ∈ N.
Customers are assumed infinitesimal and the mass of the customer population with storage capacity c is given by γ c . For each storage level c, the cumulative distribution of values is given by F c (·).
We do not impose any assumptions on the demand model {γ c , F c (·)} c=0,...,C . In particular, the correlation between the customers' valuation for the product and the storage capacity is arbitrary.
As earlier, we continue to let D denote the set of feasible prices available to the firm, which we assume to be an arbitrary nonempty closed subset of [0, V ]. The firm may select any pricing sequence p = {p t } t∈N with elements in D. We continue to denote by P the set of all such sequences. Customers are assumed to be able to fully anticipate the firm's future pricing and may time their purchases accordingly. In particular, consider a consumer with valuation v and storage capacity c. Let y t denote the number of units purchased in period t. A consumer policy y consists of a purchasing sequence and it is said to be feasible if
Here, x t denotes the consumption in period t and I t denote the inventory carried over from period t to t + 1. The expression for x t reflects the assumption, consumption always takes place if a unit is available, which is without loss of optimality for the consumers. We let Y c denote the set of feasible policies for a consumer with storage capacity c.
An individual consumer with valuation v and storage capacity c maximizes her long-term average net utility, i.e., solves
In turn, the firm seeks to maximize the long-run average revenues it collects.
Optimal Consumer Stockpiling. We first analyze the consumer problem given a policy p.
Proposition 5. For any pricing sequence p, Problem (9) admits an optimal solution and the optimal long-run net utility is given by
where e t,c (p) = min{p t−c , p t−c+1 , ..., p t }. Furthermore, there is an optimal policy such that consumption in period t takes place if and only if v ≥ e t,c (p), and the payment that was made for the unit consumed in period t is exactly e t,c (p).
The proof relies on a detailed accounting of cost of a unit consumed in period t, the derivation of an upper bound on the performance of any policy, and the construction of a policy that achieves the bound.
Hence we conclude that one may view the consumption problem of a consumer with storage capacity c in period t as one of facing an effective price of e t,c (p). In other words, while in the problem of one-time purchase with time windows studied in the earlier sections, the effective price faced by consumers was the minimum over a future time window, when consumers stockpile, the effective price associated with consumption in a given time period is the minimum price over a past time window and the length of this time window is driven by the storage capacity. As we will see, this connection enables to adapt the framework developed in the previous section to this new setting.
Optimal Pricing Policies. As we explicitly lay out in Proposition 5, it is possible to construct an optimal policy such that consumption in period t takes place if and only if v ≥ e t,c (p), and the payment that was made for the unit consumed in period t is exactly e t,c (p). Any such policy is also optimal for any finite time horizon assuming payments are deferred to consumption times. We assume next that all consumers use such policies.
We also assume that payment is effectively made only when consumption occurs, which is without loss of generality given the long-run average revenue maximization objective. For a given pricing policy p ∈ P, given the consumers optimal policy for stockpiling outline above and the associated effective prices identified, the revenues collected by the firm over the first T periods may be written as
Hence the long-run revenue rate of the firm is given by
and the firm solves
Note that the expression for R(p) is very similar to that for R(p) in (2) with the notion of effective prices being different. One may develop a parallel concept to that of reset periods that was defined in Section 3. For any pricing policy, the set of periods such that p t = e t,C (p) may now also be considered to be "reset periods." In any such period, all customers of type c, c = 0, ..., C, arrive with the same state of zero inventory (assuming they always break ties by purchasing at the period closest to the date of consumption). In the same manner as earlier, the system decouples from reset period to reset period. Using the policy decomposition idea (as in Lemma 2), one may establish again that, when the set of prices is finite, the pricing problem (11) admits an optimal solution, and one may restrict attention to cycles of length at most C|D|.
Theorem 4 (Equivalence). The problem of pricing for consumers who stockpile with a population characterized by {(γ c , F c ) : c = 0, ..., C} (Problem (11)) is equivalent to the problem of pricing to a stream of consumers who time their purchases over given time windows with characteristics {(γ c , F c ) : c = 0, ..., C} (Problem (3)) in the following sense: both problems admit the same value function and a cyclic policy that is optimal for one problem is also optimal for the other one.
We prove the result below. Consider any cyclic pricing policy p ∈ P of length T , with cycle (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p T ). Let p r denote its time reflection; it has cycle elements (p T , ..., p 2 , p 1 ). Consider Using the reflection lemma (Lemma 3), one has that R(p r ) = R(p) and we deduce that, for any cyclic policy p, R(p) = R(p). In other words, any cyclic policy that was optimal for problem (3) is also optimal for problem (11).
Hence, the two problems are in some sense equivalent and all the results regarding the bound on cycles, the structure of optimal policies and the computation of optimal policies that were derived in Sections 3-5 apply directly to the problem of pricing for consumers who stockpile with objective (9). In addition to the direct results one obtains regarding the pricing policies that emerge for this new problem, the connection between the two fundamental problems established is also of independent interest.
Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the problem of how to set prices given a customer population that arrives over time that is heterogeneous with regard to both valuation and patience. We established that the problem of finding optimal pricing policies is a tractable one with very few assumptions on the distribution of customers' willingness to wait and valuation, and proposed a novel geometrical approach for solving the problem. From a structural perspective, there are optimal pricing policies that are cyclical with a "short" period, in the sense that the cycle length is at most twice the maximum willingness to wait of the customer population. In addition, in general, the class of cyclic monotone policies is a suboptimal one and there is an opportunity cost associated with restricting attention to cyclic monotone policies that can be significant. Optimal policies often take the form of nested sales, where the firm oscillates between targeting high-value impatient customers and targeting more patient customer classes. We have further established a form of equivalence between the above problem and that of pricing to a pool of heterogeneous consumers who may stockpile units of the products over time. This equivalence enables one to obtain the same set of structural and algorithmic results for this problem. The framework and results we present in this paper lay the ground for a potential new approach to a class of intertemporal pricing problems.
Avenues for future research include not only the expansion of the set of problems that may be tackled through the present approach but also the potential use of general models of strategic consumers with heterogeneous preferences for estimation purposes.
Proof of Lemma 2. For any pricing policy p and time T , let j(T, p) denote the integer that satisfies
That is, j(T, p) defines the component policy being offered at time T .
The value of policy p is given by
where the revenue of the policy up to time T is composed of the revenue of the component policies, for components from 0 to j(T, p), plus a leftover term starting from period V j(T,p)+1 up to period T for any leftover periods not completely covered in a component policy by time T . The average revenue obtained from the leftover component
γ(w)e t,w (p)F (e t,w (p)) = 0 since the per-period revenue is bounded and the leftover term includes at most S|D| periods by Lemma 1. Therefore, the value obtained from policy p is nothing but an average of the values obtained by the component policies weighted by their lengths, i.e.,
and the revenue from the policy p is bounded by the supremum among the revenues of all the component policies of p.
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 1, every component pricing policy is a cyclic policy with length at most S|D|. Thus, the set of possible component policies is finite and its cardinality is bounded by S|D| i=1 |D| i , implying that the supremum in Eq. (4) is attained. Therefore, by the Policy Decomposition Lemma, there exists a cyclic policy with length at most S|D| that maximizes the seller's revenue.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let p be any cyclic policy with length T . It is convenient to define the natural extension of p to the set of non-positive indices. Since p r is a reflection of p, p r k = p T +1−k for any k. For any time t and willingness-to-wait w, the effective prices of the policy p and its reflection p r satisfy e T +1−t−w,w (p r ) = min
where the second equality is obtained by a change of variables k = T + 1 − k. The revenue obtained from customers with willingness-to-wait w under the reflected policy p r is
where the second equality follows from the cyclic nature of the policy and the third is derived from Eq. (12). By summing over all w from 0 to S, we obtain the desired result, i.e., R(p r ) =
Proof of Theorem 1. At first, assume the set of prices D is finite. Then, by Proposition 1, there exists an optimal cyclic policy. Let p be an optimal policy such that its length T = L p is minimal among all optimal policies. Assume, without loss of generality, that p T = min 1≤k≤T p k . Let p = min 1≤k≤T −1 p k denote the second lowest price in the policy. There can be no reset periods in {1, ..., T − 1}, otherwise a shorter optimal policy would exist by the Policy Decomposition Lemma.
Therefore, the lowest price in the policy is only used once per cycle, i.e., p T < p . Let t and t represent respectively the first and last periods in k ∈ {1, ..., T − 1} such that p k = p . Then, t ≥ T − S, since otherwise t would be a reset period. Consider now the time reflected policy p r , which yields the same revenue as p by the Reflection Lemma. In the reflected policy, the first time price p is used is at T + 1 − t and the next time the lowest price in the policy is used at time T + 1. Since T + 1 − t cannot be a reset period of the reflected policy, t ≤ S. Combining the bounds on t and t , we obtain that S ≥ t ≥ t ≥ T − S and, therefore, T ≤ 2S. This completes the proof of theorem for the case in which |D| < ∞.
Now let the set of prices D be an arbitrary closed subset of [0, V ]. Let {p i } i∈N be a sequence of feasible price sequences in P such that R(p k ) ≥ R * − 1 k , where R * = sup p∈P R(p). Let V k = V k /k and let p k be a sequence of prices such that each p k t is equal to p k rounded down to the closest element in the set {0,
Since the functions F w (·) are Lipschitz continuous for all w and the effective prices e t,w (p) are also Lipschitz continuous functions of the relevant prices p t , ..., p t+w , the revenue function R(·) is Lipschitz continuous in the infinity norm, so there exists a
. By the first part of the proof, we can obtain a policy p k such that R( p k ) ≥ R( p k ) where p k is a component policy of p k and p k has cycle length at most 2S. By construction, any price in p k is at most 1 k away from the set D. Using the Lipschitz continuity of R(·) again, we can construct a cyclic pricing policy p k ∈ P with period at most 2S such that R(p k ) ≥ R * − 2L k . By considering the limit as k goes to infinity, we observe that the supremum revenue among all cyclic policies in P with length at most 2S is also R * . Since the set D is closed and bounded, the set of cyclic policies with length at most T with 1 ≤ T ≤ 2S is compact. The problem of maximizing the average revenue over all policies with cycle exactly T = 1, ..., 2S is a maximization problem of a continuous function over a compact set. Therefore, the supremum over the set of cyclic policies with length at most 2S is attained.
Proof of Theorem 2. The text preceding the statement of the theorem explains why the Bellman equation in Eq. (6) applies to the value function W n (p) and we now construct an algorithm that uses it to find optimal pricing policies. Define the auxiliary value functionW n (p) as By Theorem 2, one can compute a policy p ε that is optimal for the set of prices D ε in time O(ΓV LS 2 /ε). Let p be the optimal policy when the set of available prices is D, and letp ε be the rounding of the prices in p down to the closest element in the set D ε . By Lipschitz continuity,
The proof is complete since p ε yields higher performance thanp ε , i.e., R(p ε ) ≥ R(p ε ).
Proof of Proposition 2. Let p be an optimal policy that is cyclic and whose cycle is of length S < L ≤ 2S. Assume without loss of generality that the lowest price is offered last in the cycle. Let k be an index such that p k is the second lowest price in the policy. If k < T − S, then k is a reset period and, by the Policy Decomposition Lemma, there exists a shorter optimal policy. If k > S, then consider the reflected policy p r . By the Reflection Lemma, this policy yields as much revenue as p. The period T + 1 − k is a reset period in the reflected policy, so by the Policy Decomposition Lemma, there exists a shorter optimal policy. Proof of Proposition 3. A corollary of the Reflection Lemma is that for any cyclic pricing policy with monotonically increasing prices, there exists a cyclic policy yielding the same revenues with monotonically decreasing prices. Without loss of generality, let us prove the result for nondecreasing policies. Consider an arbitrary cyclic non-decreasing policy with length T ≤ 2S. If T ≤ S + 1, there is nothing to prove. Suppose T > S + 1. Then the system necessarily resets at periods 1 and T − S − 1 since p 1 = min{p 1 , ..., p S+1 }, and p T −S−1 = min{p T −S−1 , ..., p T }.
By the Policy Decomposition Lemma, there exists a cyclic policy with length less or equal than max{T − S − 1, S + 1} ≤ S + 1 that dominates the original policy.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider an arbitrary cyclic monotonic policy with length T > j. Without loss of generality, by the Reflection Lemma and Proposition 3, one may assume that the policy is non-increasing over the cycle and that T ≤ S + 1.
We next establish that one may construct a policy with weakly higher revenues such that p 1 = v 0 , ..., p j = v j−1 .
Suppose that p 1 > v 0 . If p T ≥ v 0 , then one may increase revenues by setting p 1 = p 2 = ... = p T = v 0 . Otherwise, let k = min{i ∈ {1, ..., S +1} : p i < v 0 }. In such a case, one may again increase revenues by setting p 1 = p 2 = ... = p k = v 0 . Suppose now p 1 ≤ v 0 . Note that since the policy is non-increasing, one may assume that only impatient customers (with w = 0) purchase in period 1 when computing revenues. Hence, one may increase revenues by setting p 1 = v 0 . We conclude that one may always weakly increase revenues by setting p 1 = v 0 while maintaining the non-increasing structure.
Assuming that p 1 = v 0 and the policy is non-increasing, and using the fact that R(v 0 ) ≤ R(v 1 ) ≤ ... ≤ R(v j−1 ), one may show in a recursive fashion that one may weakly increase revenues by setting p 2 = v 1 ,, ..., p j = v j−1 .
We now assume without loss of generality that p i = v i−1 , i = 1, ..., j.
Case 1: p j+1 ≤ v j . Then increasing p j+1 to v j−1 does not alter the non-increasing structure of the policy and yields an additional R(v j−1 ) − R(v j ) > 0 per cycle and hence strictly increases revenues and the initial policy was suboptimal.
Case 2: p j+1 > v j . Since the policy is non-increasing, one has that p j+1 ≤ p j = v j−1 . If p j+1 < v j−1 , then one may strictly increase revenues by increasing it to v j−1 . Suppose that p j+1 = v j−1 . In such a case, consider the policy q 1 , ..., q T that coincides with p with the exception of period j + 1. In particular, we set q j+1 = v 0 .
We deduce that p was necessarily suboptimal.
We conclude that any optimal cyclic policy with length T > j is non-monotone.
Proof of Proposition 5. To simplify notation, we assume without loss of generality that p −C+1 = ... = p 0 =V + 1. Without loss of generality, we may assume that units are consumed in a FIFO (First in First Out) fashion, as units are indistinguishable. Assuming such an order in consumption will enable one to track units in the system and in particular track the purchasing price of a unit consumed in a given period t.
For any policy y and T > 0, we let U y T = T t=1 vx t − p t y t denote the utility generated over the T first time periods.
Step 1: An upper bound on performance. Let A t represent the set of periods such that, if the consumer would stop purchasing at that period, they would still have enough inventory left over to consume at period t, i.e., A t = { ≤ t : I ≥ t − }. Then, under the FIFO rule for consumption and given the fact that consumption is never delayed, the price paid for a unit consumed in period t (if consumption takes place) is given by p jt where j t = min{ : ∈ A t }.
Note that for all ∈ A t , by the feasibility of the policy, t − ≤ I ≤ c, and hence, ≥ t − c.
This implies that if a unit is consumed in period t, i.e., x t > 0, then the price paid for that unit, p jt , is such that p jt ≥ e t,c (p).
For any T > 0,
(v − e t,c (p)) + .
We deduce that for any feasible policy y,
Step 2: An optimal consumer policy. Consider a policy y where the consumer purchases a unit to consume at period l at the first period starting from l − c when she observes a price that is equal to e l,c (p), assuming this price is at most v.
We represent whether the consumer buys a unit at time t to consume at time l by z l,t and wether the consumer owns a unit at time t to consume at time l by q l,t . Using this representation, the total purchases at time t equal
and whether consumption occurs at time t is x t = q t,t . The policy we are considering is given by the following algorithm:
Set I 1 = 0, q ,s = 0, z ,s = 0, for , s ∈ Z.
For all t ≥ 1, -For all ∈ {t, t + 1, ..., t + c},
-If p t = e ,c (p), v ≥ p t and q ,t−1 = 0, Then set z ,t = 1.
-Set q ,t = q ,t−1 + z ,t .
We first show that the policy is feasible and then derive its performance. The first step is to establish that I t = t+c =t+1 q ,t . We proceed by induction. For t = 0, the result is trivial. Suppose the result is true for t − 1. One has I t = I t−1 + y t − x t = t+c−1 =t q ,t−1 + t+c =t z ,t − x t = t+c =t+1 q ,t + (q t,t−1 + z t,t ) − x t where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis and Eq. (14); and the third equality follows from the definition of q ·,· and the fact that q t+c,t−1 = 0. Note that (q t,t−1 + z t,t ) − x t = q t,t − x t = 0. One deduces that I t = t+c =t+1 q ,t and the induction step is complete. The result above in particular implies that I t ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 1 and that I t = t+c =t+1 q ,t ≤ c, and hence the policy is feasible.
We next now derive the performance of the policy. We establish by induction that 
